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FAILING TO REALIZE NICHOLSON’S
VISION: HOW NEW YORK’S CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO
PUNISH BATTERED MOTHERS
Jaime Perrone

I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2010, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) initiated
child neglect proceedings against an anonymous mother and
father.1 These proceedings were ostensibly based on two
allegations: that the father had abused the mother in the presence
of their three children, and that neither parent was ensuring the
children’s regular school attendance.2 CPS obtained a court
order directing that the children be placed in the temporary
custody of their grandmother, and the court issued a temporary
order of protection against the father.3 In August 2010, the
J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., Pace University, 2008.
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William Denker, and the entire staff of the Brooklyn Law School Journal of
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thank Desmond Rozario, and my parents, Marisa and James Perrone, for
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1
In re. David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (Fam. Ct. 2010). The opinion
refers to the local child protective agency as New York City Children’s
Services, which is more commonly known as the Administration for
Children’s Services (“ACS”). However, since this Note also examines child
neglect cases outside of New York City, for the sake of consistency I will use
the term CPS to refer to all child protective services agencies in New York
State.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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mother requested a Family Court Act section 1028 hearing4 for
the return of her son, David.5 The court ordered that David be
immediately returned to his mother’s custody on the condition
that she was to cooperate with CPS supervision, enter a
domestic violence shelter, enforce an order of protection against
the father, and participate in domestic violence counseling.6
In compliance with the court’s mandate, the mother moved
into a domestic violence shelter with David.7 Unfortunately,
David’s father violated the order of protection by following them
to the shelter, and they were forced to leave.8 During the
tumultuous week that followed, the mother violated the court’s
order by missing one counseling session and by not informing
CPS that she had left the shelter.9 Indifferent to the
circumstances surrounding the mother’s brief lapse in
compliance, CPS placed David in foster care, this time without a
court order.10
The next day, the court held a Family Court Act section
1027 hearing11 to determine whether David was in “imminent
risk” of danger such as to warrant removal.12 CPS argued that
David was at risk because “of the possibility that the mother
might decide to return to the father.”13 Yet, CPS did not offer
any concrete evidence to support this allegation.14 CPS even
admitted that before being forced to leave the shelter, the mother

4

See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1028(a) (McKinney 2009) (“Upon the
application of the parent . . . the court shall hold a hearing to determine
whether the child should be returned . . . .”).
5
David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
6
Id. at 894–95.
7
Id. at 895.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1027(b)(i) (McKinney 2009) (stating
that for CPS to remove a child without a court order, such removal must be
“necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health”).
12
David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 895–96.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 896.

Failing to Realize Nicholson’s Vision

643

had been in total compliance with the court’s command.15
Nevertheless, a CPS caseworker testified that the mother’s
breach cast doubt on her credibility and demonstrated that she
could not be trusted to obey court orders.16
The court ultimately concluded that CPS had not met its
burden of proof and had contravened the basic precepts of
Nicholson v. Scoppetta by removing David from his mother’s
care.17 In Nicholson, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that victims of domestic violence cannot be found guilty of
neglect solely because their children have witnessed their
mothers’ abuse.18 While the David G. court immediately
returned David to his mother, it did not dismiss the neglect
proceeding.19 Moreover, David was only paroled to his mother
on the condition that she was to cooperate with CPS supervision
and referrals for domestic violence services while the neglect
case was ongoing.20
The case of David G. is troublesome for a number of
reasons. First, CPS’s primary basis for depriving the mother of
custody appears to be her children’s exposure to the abuse she

15

Id.
Id.
17
Id. at 901; see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 853
(N.Y. 2004) (“[E]mergency removal is appropriate where the danger is so
immediate, so urgent that the child’s life or safety will be at risk before an ex
parte order can be obtained. The standard obviously is a stringent one.”); see
also infra Part III (discussing the impact of Nicholson on child neglect
proceedings against battered mothers in New York).
18
Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844. Throughout this Note, I refer to
domestic violence victims as women and batterers as men for the sake of
consistency and to reflect the fact that the overwhelming majority of domestic
violence victims are indeed women. See Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L
COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July 2007), http://www.ncadv.org/
files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (stating that 85% of domestic
violence victims are women); Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/intimate/victims.cfm
(last modified Apr. 4, 2012) (stating that between 1976 and 2005, intimate
partners committed 30% of homicides against females versus 5% of males).
19
David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
20
Id.
16
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suffered at the hands of their father.21 While CPS also accused
the mother of failing to ensure that her children regularly
attended school, the court opinion does not articulate any
support for that allegation.22 Furthermore, the mother is only
ordered to comply with domestic violence services.23 Second, the
father’s violation of the order of protection was the impetus
behind CPS placing David in foster care, despite the mother’s
best efforts to keep her and David safe.24 The caseworker who
testified focused narrowly on the mother’s lapse in compliance,
and did not consider that the mother fled the domestic violence
shelter—which she had entered at the court’s direction—in order
to avoid further abuse.25 Finally, it is unclear on what grounds
the family court kept the neglect proceeding open, because it did
not elaborate on its additional reasons for suspecting her of
neglect, as required by Nicholson.26 Thus, despite having
admonished CPS for violating Nicholson by removing David, the
court seemingly continued the neglect case against the mother
primarily because she was a victim of domestic violence.27
This Note argues that CPS agencies in New York contradict
the policy goals of Nicholson when they remove children from
their nonviolent parents chiefly due to the children’s exposure to
domestic violence, despite the presence of other, usually minor
charges. In addition, this Note contends that, under Nicholson,
family courts should dismiss these neglect proceedings if they
cannot articulate a separate, credible ground for suspecting the
mother of neglect. Part II of this Note describes the path of a
CPS case in New York, exploring the various ways it can travel
through the family court system. Part III discusses the landmark
Nicholson case and why charging battered mothers with neglect
is problematic. It also considers the role class and gender may
play in the child welfare system and analyzes the current flaws
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 894.
See id.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 896.
See David G., 909 N.Y.S.2d. 891.
See id.
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in CPS practice. Part IV examines court decisions postNicholson which suggest that its vision has yet to be realized and
argues that in order to more effectively further the goals of
Nicholson, family courts must clearly delineate their
consideration of the Nicholson factors in neglect proceedings
against battered mothers. Finally, Part V proposes holistic
solutions for change that will require the cooperation of CPS and
New York family courts, as well as increased community
support for families affected by domestic violence.
II. THE PATH OF CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT CASES IN
NEW YORK STATE
CPS cases begin when someone calls a report of suspected
child abuse or neglect to a hotline operated by the New York
State Central Register of Child Abuse or Maltreatment
(“SCR”).28 If the SCR finds sufficient cause to suspect abuse or
neglect, they will send the report to the local child protection
agency.29 Next, a caseworker will have twenty-four hours to
initiate and sixty days to complete an investigation to determine
the accuracy of the report.30 During the investigation, the
caseworker will assess the condition of the child’s home and
interview the child’s parents and any other person with
potentially vital information concerning the child’s well-being.31
At the end of the investigation the caseworker will either declare
the report to be “unfounded” or “indicated” (i.e. accurate).32
28

N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 422(1), 422-a (McKinney 2010); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432 (2012); see also INMOTION &
BROOKLYN BAR ASS’N VOLUNTEER LAWYERS PROJECT, ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2002) [hereinafter ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES], available at http://www.inmotiononline.org/assets/pdfs/TheBasics
Series_English/Abuse_and_Neglect.pdf.
29
SOC. SERV. §§ 415, 422.2(b); COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §
432.2(b)(2); see also ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 5.
30
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 432.2(b)(3), 432.3(k); see also
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6.
31
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 432.2(b)(3), 432.3(k); see also
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6.
32
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(3)(iv); see also ABUSE
AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 28, at 6.
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When a report is indicated, CPS may bring child protective
proceedings against the parents by filing a petition under Article
10 of the Family Court Act.33 CPS may either commence such
proceedings while the investigation is pending, or if the report is
deemed indicated, after the investigation is complete.34 Shortly
thereafter, the court must hold a preliminary hearing to evaluate
whether the child’s interests should be protected while the final
order of disposition is pending.35 CPS has the burden of proving
that removal is necessary “to avoid imminent risk to the child’s
life or health.”36 The court must consider whether CPS made
reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal and whether
removing the offending parent from the child’s home via an
order of protection would lessen the risk to the child.37
There are other avenues available to CPS and the family
courts if there is not enough time to file a petition and hold a
preliminary hearing.38 For instance, the court may issue an order
of removal at an expedited preliminary hearing.39 However, if
CPS determines that the child is in such immediate danger that
there is not enough time for the expedited preliminary hearing,
it may remove a child from its parents without a court order.40
When CPS conducts an emergency removal without a court
order, the child’s parents may apply for a Family Court Act
section 1028 hearing to secure their child’s return.41 This hearing
33

N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1032(a) (McKinney 2011).
See JUD. CT. ACTS § 1032(a); SOC. SERV. §§ 397(2)(b), 424(11); see
also, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 167 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
35
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(a); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d
at 167.
36
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(b)(i); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp.
2d at 167.
37
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1027(b); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d
at 167.
38
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1022; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
167.
39
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1022; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
167.
40
JUD. CT. ACTS §§ 1022, 1024; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 417
(McKinney 2010); see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 167.
41
JUD. CT. ACTS § 1028; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
34
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must take place within three days of the parents’ application.42
At this hearing, the court may decide to “parole” the child to his
or her parents while the proceeding continues.43 The child is then
released into the temporary custody of his or her parents,
although usually with broad oversight by CPS.44
After the preliminary issues have been resolved, the next
step in the court proceedings is the fact-finding stage.45 This is
generally a long and arduous process.46 Nicholas Scoppetta, the
previous Commissioner of New York City’s Administration for
Children’s Services has stated, “Once you are in the Family
Court, you are in it very often for many months before you can
get to the substance of the case . . . .”47 Therefore, child
protective caseworkers play a crucial gate-keeping role in
ensuring that the only cases entering the family court system are
the ones that belong there.
III. NICHOLSON’S ATTEMPT TO DECOUPLE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND NEGLECT
New York State’s definition of neglect has undergone a
significant evolution in recent years. Section 1012 of the Family
Court Act defines a neglected child as one “whose physical,
mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure
of his parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care.”48 For
years, courts could find battered mothers to be neglectful based
on their perceived failure to protect their children from exposure
to domestic violence.49 In fact, CPS could remove children from
168.
42

JUD. CT. ACTS § 1028; see also, e.g., Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at

168.
43

Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2009).
49
See The “Failure to Protect” Working Grp., Charging Battered
Mothers with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM
44
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their mother’s custody in cases where the only allegation was
that the mother herself had been abused.50
The landmark Nicholson decision dramatically changed the
definition of neglect in New York by holding that battered
mothers could not be found neglectful solely because their
children were exposed to domestic violence.51 The Nicholson
court determined that removing children from their nonviolent
parents unfairly punishes battered mothers52 and, when it comes
to the child’s welfare, may in fact do more harm than good.53
This decision was an important first step for New York in
moving away from a child welfare system that often blamed
victims for their abuse instead of holding batterers accountable.
In order to comply with Nicholson, local CPS agencies must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s
“physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or
is in imminent danger of becoming impaired” and that this is
“clearly attributable” to the mother’s failure to exercise a
“minimum degree of care” toward the child.54 The court
emphasized that the statute merely required a “‘baseline minimal
degree of care’—not maximum, not best, not ideal—and the
failure must be actual, not threatened.”55 It is important to note
that this “minimal degree of care” is a very low bar.56
Furthermore, in determining whether a parent has met this
nominal standard of care, courts must objectively consider
URB. L.J. 849, 849–54 (2000); see also G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered
Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 107–
08 (1999).
50
See Miccio, supra note 49, at 92 (citing In re Theresa, 576 N.Y.S.2d
937 (App. Div. 1991)); see also In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470
(Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that neglect is a strict liability offense).
51
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 853 (N.Y. 2004) (“Plainly,
more is required for a showing of neglect under New York law than the fact
that a child was exposed to domestic abuse against the caretaker.”).
52
See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 200 (E.D.N.Y.
2002).
53
Id. at 204.
54
Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 845–46.
55
Id. at 846 (citing In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979)).
56
Id.
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whether “a reasonable and prudent parent would have so acted,
or failed to act, under the circumstances then and there
existing.”57
When judging whether a battered mother has acted
reasonably under the circumstances, courts must consider the
risks attendant to leaving, if the batterer has threatened to
kill her if she does; risks attendant to staying and
suffering continued abuse; risks attendant to seeking
assistance through government channels, potentially
increasing the danger to herself and her children; risks
attendant to criminal prosecution against the abuser; and
risks attendant to relocation.58
Furthermore, the determination of whether a battered mother has
failed to exercise the requisite basic level of care “is necessarily
dependent on facts such as the severity and frequency of the
violence, and the resources and options available to her.”59
Additionally, each case must be individually assessed to
determine “whether the imminent risk to the child can be
mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. [The court]
must balance that risk against the harm removal might
bring . . . .”60 In addition, the court must evaluate whether the
need for removal could be eradicated by offering the mother and
child preventive services.61 Thus, after Nicholson, CPS
caseworkers may no longer charge battered mothers with neglect
solely because their child was exposed to domestic violence.62

57

Id. (citing In re Jessica YY., 685 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (App. Div.
1999)).
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing In re Melissa U., 538 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989)).
60
Id. at 852.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 844. However, the court cautioned that a battered mother could
still properly be charged with neglect where “a preponderance of the
evidence establishes that the children were actually or imminently harmed by
reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in providing them with
proper oversight.” Id. at 847. The court offers several examples where
additional factors are present other than the children’s mere exposure to the
domestic violence. Id.
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A. Charging Battered Mothers with Neglect is Problematic
An overview of the complexities underlying domestic
violence is helpful to understanding the importance of
Nicholson’s vision that battered mothers should not be blamed
for the abuse they have endured.63 Various theories have been
propounded to explain the psychological effects of domestic
violence on battered women.64 The New York State Office for
the Prevention of Domestic Violence (“OPDV”) defines
domestic violence as a pattern of verbal, psychological, and/or
physical abuse by one person in order to control the other
person in an intimate relationship.65 Abuse, therefore, need not
be physical in order to have an impact.66
Before the inception of the Battered Women’s Movement in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, domestic violence was
considered
a
private
family
matter
and
therefore
“noncriminal.”67 Police officers responding to domestic violence
calls would often “tell the husband to ‘cool off’ by ‘taking a
walk around the block.’”68 The Battered Women’s Movement
shed light on the severity of domestic violence and developed
community resources to assist battered women.69 Today, the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office describes domestic violence
as “a public health crisis that affects us all.”70 In 2010, New
York City police responded to 249,440 domestic violence

63

See generally Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d 840.
See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT
OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 117–20 (2007) [hereinafter STARK, COERCIVE
CONTROL].
65
See Domestic Violence: Finding Safety and Support—Understanding
the Problem, N.Y.S. OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/help/fss/theproblem.html#whatisdv (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012).
66
See id.
67
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the
Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1662.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1666.
70
Domestic Violence, N.Y. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
http://manhattanda.org/hot-topic (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
64
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incidents, which translates to about 680 incidents per day.71
Moreover, New York State’s OPDV estimates that intimate
partner violence accounts for 3% of all violence against males
and 23% of all violence against females in the United States.72
Dr. Lenore Walker, a clinical and forensic psychologist,
developed the “Cycle Theory of Violence” in an effort to
explain the complex interpersonal dynamics of an abusive
relationship.73 According to this theory, a recurring battering
cycle is composed of three phases.74 The first phase is
characterized by “a gradual escalation of tension” through the
batterer’s verbal or physical abuse of his partner.75 During this
phase, the woman learns to walk on eggshells to avoid angering
her abuser.76 She tries her best to pacify him, but her inability to
predict his responses leads to the creation of “learned
helplessness.”77 Dr. Walker defines “learned helplessness” as
“having lost the ability to predict that what you do will make a
particular outcome occur,” and argues that because such coping
behavior is learned, it can also be unlearned.78 The second phase
occurs after the batterer has created such an atmosphere of
tension that an explosion of physical violence is inescapable
without intervention.79 Finally, in the third phase, the batterer
may express remorse for his physical violence and promise to
never do it again.80 He may be loving and attentive, reminding
71

Domestic Violence Annual Fact Sheet 2010, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE
COMBAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ocdv/
downloads/pdf/2010_annual_DVFactSheet .pdf (2010). The City’s Domestic
Violence Hotline also took 119,177 calls, an average daily total of more than
320. Id.
72
National Intimate Partner Violence Statistics, N.Y.S. OFFICE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/statistics/
nationaldvdata/natlipvstats.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
73
See generally LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 126–38 (2d ed. 2000).
74
Id. at 126.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 116.
79
Id. at 126–27.
80
Id. at 127.
TO
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the woman of why she fell in love with him.81 Even if the
batterer does not express any remorse, the absence of violence
and tension alone may reinforce the battered woman’s belief that
her partner’s violent behavior was an aberration.82
The theory of “traumatic bonding,” developed by
sociologists Donald Dutton and Susan Painter, provides
additional insight into the dynamics of an abusive relationship.83
It refers to “the development and course of strong emotional ties
between two persons where one person intermittently harasses,
beats, threatens, abuses or intimidates the other.”84 According to
traumatic bonding theory, abusive relationships are characterized
by a mutually dependent power imbalance and intermittent
abusive episodes.85 The woman views the first violent incident as
an aberration; she does not believe her partner will hurt her
again.86 As the abuse become more frequent and severe, the
woman comes to believe that it is her fault and that it is within
her power to prevent it from happening again.87 By the time the
woman realizes that she cannot control the abuse, the
relationship’s power imbalance has intensified; she feels
dependent on her batterer, and her batterer in turn needs her to
maintain his sense of dominance.88
Furthermore, many actions taken by a battered mother may
be the result of rational, reasoned choices as to what will best
protect her and her children.89 For example, an abused woman
81

Id.
Id. at 126.
83
Don Dutton & Susan Lee Painter, Traumatic Bonding: The Development
of Emotional Attachments in Battered Women and Other Relationships of
Intermittent Abuse, 6 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT’L J. 139, 139 (1983).
84
Id. at 146–47.
85
Id. at 147–48.
86
Id. at 151.
87
Id.
88
Donald G. Dutton & Susan Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive
Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
105, 106–07 (1993).
89
Amy R. Melner, Rights of Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused
Children: Courts’ Termination of Battered Women’s Parental Rights Due to
Failure to Protect Their Children From Abuse, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 299, 309 (1998).
82
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may reasonably believe that she will be in more danger if she
leaves the relationship than if she stays.90 Indeed, this is often
accurate, as a battered woman is at a higher risk of severe or
fatal injury after leaving her abuser.91 In addition, lack of
financial resources, social support, an inadequate number of
domestic violence shelters, and fear of losing her children may
cause a battered woman to rationally decide that it will be better
for her and her children if she stays in the relationship.92
Moreover, in order to properly ascertain the impact domestic
violence has on a battered woman, the abuse should be viewed
as an ongoing, continuous event.93 Even when there is a lull in
the physical violence, an abused woman lives with the fear and
certainty that such violence could erupt at any moment.94 Her
fear is derived not just from the immediate threat her batterer is
presenting, but also from what she knows he is capable of.95
While courts and caseworkers may assume that the
psychological manifestations of abuse are fundamental to the
character of battered mothers, such symptoms generally
disappear after the abusive relationship is over.96 While some
battered women may continue to enter into violent relationships,
the reality is that many do not.97 In fact, Dr. Walker’s research
into the behavior of domestic violence victims discovered that
when beginning new relationships, “[battered women] were
extremely careful not to choose another violent [man].”98
While she is in the grip of an abusive relationship, however,
a battered woman may feel as though she cannot escape.99 This
psychological response should be attributed to “the nature of the
relationship, not the nature of the woman.”100 Behavior that may
90

Id. at 309–10.
STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 64, at 115.
92
Melner, supra note 89, at 308–15.
93
Id. at 305.
94
See id.
95
See id.
96
Id. at 309.
97
Id.
98
Id. (quoting LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 28 (1979)).
99
Id. at 308.
100
Id.
91
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seem irrational to an outsider could instead be “a terrified human
being’s normal response to an abnormal and dangerous
situation.”101 A batterer creates a “generalized feeling of
powerlessness” in his victim.102 He may force her to choose
between her own safety and the safety of her children, or threaten
to hurt her if she reports his violence to the authorities.103 Thus,
courts should not assume that the actions a battered woman takes
while she is in an abusive relationship are evidence of her true
character.104
In addition, it is important to view domestic violence within
the broader framework of societal gender inequality.105 Narrowly
focusing on the individual correlates of intimate partner violence
ignores the fact that partner abuse does not occur in a vacuum;
rather, it is “a chosen behavior occurring in a larger structural
context.”106 Susan Schechter, a leading feminist scholar, argues
that domestic violence should be viewed as a collective problem
caused by women’s oppression, rather than as one of individual
victimization.107 Similarly, Dr. Stark, a nationally recognized
expert on domestic violence and an expert witness for the
plaintiffs in Nicholson, argues that while trauma theory is
helpful to explain why many battered women fail to effectively
utilize support services, it is also dangerous because it shifts the
focus from the batterer’s actions to the victim’s response, which
may reinforce the stereotype that victims of domestic violence
are at least partially to blame for their abuse.108
101

Id. (quoting LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED
WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 180 (1990)).
102
Geneva Brown, When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An
Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189,
214 (2005).
103
Evan Stark, Nicholson v. Williams Revisited: When Good People Do
Bad Things, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 715 (2005) [hereinafter, Stark, Good
People].
104
See generally id. at 713–16.
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This shift in accountability is amplified by the fact that child
protective workers are often encouraged, and indeed may find it
easier, to deal with the nonviolent parent.109 Professor Leigh
Goodmark, of the University of Baltimore School of Law,
suggests that “this reluctance may stem from fear of the
perpetrator, the difficulty of tracking the perpetrator down, lack
of appropriate services to offer batterers, or the absence of a
familial relationship between the perpetrator and the child.”110
However, basing a neglect charge against a battered woman on
her abusive partner’s actions only furthers the power imbalance
of the relationship; the court sends her the message that she is a
“bad mother” and that she is at least partly to blame for what
has transpired.111 Yet, in families affected by domestic violence,
both mother and child are victims at the offender’s hands.112
Therefore, it is imperative that CPS and family courts do not
punish battered mothers for being abused. Family courts in
particular must take care to ensure that CPS has an alternative
basis for any neglect charges it may bring against battered
women.
B. Role of Class and Gender in the System’s Treatment of
Battered Mothers
Some suggest that there are two separate child welfare
systems: one for families that are poor, and one for families that
are not.113 Whereas the custody battles of upper-class families are
109

Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child
Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 620 (2004) (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF PUB.
CHILD WELFARE ADM’RS, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE
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VIOLENCE 10 (2001)).
110
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111
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largely dealt with in private divorce actions, the problems of
low-income families are usually relegated to public child
protective agencies, such as CPS.114 This is illustrated by the
disparity in treatment of private custody and visitation disputes
in Supreme Court, where access is largely limited to families
who can afford private counsel, and actions brought in family
courts, which are overwhelmingly against or on behalf of lowincome persons.115 The stark contrast between the legal system’s
treatment of affluent and indigent children has existed in
America since the inception of the child welfare movement, and
continues today.116
Domestic violence cases that would ordinarily result in a
report of neglect if handled by CPS may not have the same
result when they arise in the context of a private civil action.
For instance, in J.R v. N.R., a father filed a petition in
Richmond County Supreme Court seeking visitation with his
seventeen-year-old daughter, Nicole.117 The mother alleged that
she had been physically, sexually, and emotionally abused by
her husband throughout their marriage.118 She also testified that
her husband had physically abused Nicole on more than one
occasion.119 In one such incident the father kicked Nicole and
broke her finger.120 When the mother took Nicole to the doctor,
however, she lied about the source of Nicole’s injuries and
directed Nicole to do the same because she was scared that
Nicole would be placed in foster care if she told the truth.121 The
114
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court stated that, while it “obviously does not condone Mother’s
failure to tell the truth about how Nicole’s finger was injured,
[it] does credit Mother’s testimony that Father told her that her
children might well be removed if another incident was
reported.”122 In 2003, the father was excluded from the home via
an order of protection after the mother came home from work to
find that her husband had beat Nicole “black and blue” for
“telling on him.”123 Yet, the J.R. court does not mention the
mother ever being investigated for neglect, despite her testimony
that her husband had been physically abusive towards her and
the children throughout their approximately sixteen year
marriage.124
On the contrary, parties in family court do not seem to
receive such sympathetic treatment. For example, in David G.,
the family court did not dismiss a neglect proceeding against a
mother whose only potentially viable offense was not ensuring
her children’s regular school attendance.125 Moreover, in In re
Christopher B., the family court found a battered mother guilty
of neglect for not being cognizant of the impact her batterer’s
substance abuse had on her children.126 These cases serve as
examples of the disparate treatment that may occur when neglect
allegations arise in the context of neglect proceedings initiated
by CPS versus those that arise in private divorce actions.127
In addition, fathers may be pardoned for situations that
would ordinarily result in neglect proceedings against mothers.
Professor Jane Murphy, of the University Of Baltimore School
Of Law, argues that because mothers are more likely to be the
primary caretakers of children, they are more likely than fathers
128
to be indicated in child neglect reports. This is partly due to
122
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mothers’ increased visibility to schools, doctors, and others
likely to report abuse, and the expectation that even if the father
is the perpetrator, the mother should have done something to
protect her child.129 Fathers, on the other hand, are not expected
to be the primary caretakers of their children, and thus the
quality of their parenting does not face as much scrutiny.130
For example, in C.S. v. J.S., the husband brought a private
divorce action against his wife in the Nassau County Supreme
Court, on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.131 He
alleged that when his wife became pregnant for the second time,
she began to engage in a pattern of physical, verbal, and
psychological abuse against him, which caused him to feel
frightened and humiliated.132 In addition, he alleged that his wife
grabbed their oldest child by the neck, pinning her against the
wall, and slapped their youngest child in the face, in his
presence, causing him to feel “helpless [and] afraid.”133 After
petitioning for an order of protection, child protective services
filed neglect petitions on behalf of the children against their
mother.134
Although the husband in C.S. admitted that he had witnessed
his wife use physical violence against their children and that he
had felt powerless to intervene, he does not appear to have been
indicated for neglect.135 By contrast, in Green v. Mattingly, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York largely dismissed the claims brought by a battered mother
that her and her son’s constitutional rights were violated when
From Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
688, 708 (1998).
129
Id. at 718; see also Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A
Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 285–97
(discussing this phenomenon and the gender stereotypes which perpetuate it).
130
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at 287–300.
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2009).
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her son was placed in foster care for four days without her
consent.136 In chronicling the family court case that served as the
basis for the lawsuit, the court detailed how Ms. Green was
charged with neglect because her husband had slapped their
seven-month-old child in the face.137 Ms. Green was living in a
homeless shelter at the time of the incident, and immediately
notified the authorities upon learning of her husband’s actions.138
Despite the fact that her son was returned to her care after four
days, Ms. Green remained under CPS supervision for more than
one year while the neglect case against her remained open.139
There are many reasons why cases like J.R. and C.S. are
distinguishable from a CPS case, but if the previously mentioned
cases are any indication, the mother in J.R. and the father in
C.S. may very well have had their children removed from their
care if they had entered the family court through a CPS
investigation. In both cases, the nonviolent parents were victims
of domestic violence who knew that their partners were
physically abusing their children and yet did not immediately
contact the authorities.140 These cases are examples of situations
in which more affluent parents were not charged with neglect,
although neglect charges may have been filed against lowerincome families.
C. Persistent Issues in CPS Treatment of Domestic Violence
Cases
Nicholson was an important first step for New York family
courts and child welfare agencies to move away from a system
136
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that labeled victims of domestic violence neglectful simply
because they were abused in front of their children.141 Yet, the
same problems of hasty removal by overburdened caseworkers
that existed before Nicholson continue to be at issue today.
These problems are particularly apparent in cases where failure
to protect is a primary focus of a neglect case against a battered
mother.
1. The Crucial Role Played by CPS Caseworkers and the Need
for More Stringent Qualifications
Caseworkers have vast discretion in determining whether a
child should be removed from his or her primary caretaker for
neglect.142 Unlike child abuse, which can be substantiated by
physical evidence, the perceived potential for harm is enough to
commence neglect proceedings.143 Initially, it is entirely up to the
investigating caseworker to determine whether such potential for
harm exists.144 In certain situations, the caseworker can even
remove the child from his or her home prior to obtaining a court
order.145 Under these conditions, there is a very real danger that
caseworkers will impose their subjective values of appropriate
child rearing on the families they investigate.146
Yet, many caseworkers are not particularly qualified to make
these sensitive judgment calls.147 For example, in New York City, a
CPS caseworker need only have a bachelor’s degree with twenty141

See supra Part II.
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four credits in “any combination of . . . social work, psychology,
sociology, human services, criminal justice, education . . . nursing,
or cultural anthropology.”148 Worker burnout and high turnover
rates are commonplace in child welfare agencies, and as such many
caseworkers are inexperienced recent college graduates.149
Moreover, overburdened caseworkers are incentivized to
place children in foster care to avoid being held responsible for
abuse that occurs after they have taken action to “protect” the
child.150 Dorothy Roberts, a renowned expert on issues of race,
gender, and the law, argues that “[r]isk-averse authorities are
more afraid of making the wrong decision to return a child to an
abusive home than of making the wrong decision to keep a child
in state custody.”151 For example, while a caseworker that does
not remove a child may be vulnerable to disciplinary sanction if
the child is later discovered to be abused, caseworkers are rarely
blamed for harm inflicted on children in foster care.152
2. The Detrimental Effects of Removing Children Exposed to
Domestic Violence
Foster care is not necessarily a better alternative for children
deemed to be abused or neglected.153 The act of removal in and
of itself is particularly traumatic, even under the best of
circumstances.154 Dorothy Roberts argues that removing a child
from his or her parents is not only one of the most severe
governmental intrusions into a parent’s life, but is also an

148
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extremely frightening experience for a child.155 Children in foster
care are often moved to multiple homes, which can negatively
impact their sense of security, independence, and self-esteem.156
Common reactions to removal include feelings of abandonment
and helplessness.157 To compensate for this lack of control,
children may blame themselves for the separation in an effort to
feel that they are still an important part of their parents’ lives or
to avoid feeling angry with their parents.158 In addition,
separated children are often fearful that they will be retaliated
against, because they believe that removal is their fault and that
they must be punished for it.159
For children exposed to domestic violence, “where the bond
to the primary caretaker has already been made fragile by abuse,
the trauma of placement can be particularly harsh, evoking
powerful feelings of guilt and self-loathing that can leave lasting
scars.”160 Children that have been exposed to domestic violence
“often experience their immediate universe as unpredictable and
unstable.”161 Children may also perceive their removal as a
punishment.162 They may experience anxiety concerning the
battered parent’s safety and guilt that their absence has left them
unprotected.163 Thus, the negative effects removal has on a child
must be considered along with the dangers of child maltreatment.164
Removing these children from their nonviolent parents often revictimizes them; in addition to the trauma inflicted on them by
155
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their abusive parent, they are now thrust against their will into an
unfamiliar situation that may not even be a safer alternative.165
IV. COURT DECISIONS AFTER NICHOLSON SUGGEST
THAT ITS VISION HAS YET TO BE REALIZED
A review of neglect proceedings brought by CPS against
battered mothers suggests that while CPS and New York family
courts may technically be complying with the mandate of
Nicholson, they have not fully embraced its underlying spirit.166
Although CPS may no longer bring neglect proceedings against
a battered mother solely because she is a victim of domestic
violence, there have been a number of post-Nicholson cases in
which, despite the inclusion of various relatively minor
allegations, the mother’s victimization appears to have been the
primary charge.167 In addition, family courts continue neglect
proceedings against battered mothers in cases where CPS fails to
either meet the requisite “imminent risk” standard necessary for
removal, or to provide an alternative ground for suspecting the
mother of neglect.168 Usually, the mother is ordered to
participate in domestic violence services, pending a final order
of disposition, which may not happen for a significant amount of
time.169 The following court decisions suggest that Nicholson’s
vision has yet to fully be realized in New York family courts.170
David G. is an example of this phenomenon. In that case,
the judge admonished CPS for violating Nicholson by conducting
a removal from a victim of domestic violence.171 The court found
that neither mere speculation that the mother might return to her
batterer, nor the father’s violation of the order of protection
were sufficient to establish that imminent risk was present,
165
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warranting removal.172 Yet, the court did not articulate its
reasoning for keeping the neglect proceeding open and
conditioning the mother’s parental custody on her compliance
with domestic violence services.173 While the court could have
relied on the allegation that the children were not consistently
attending school, the court did not articulate this.174 Moreover,
every condition that the mother was ordered to comply with
related to her victimization, despite the court having found that
CPS violated Nicholson by removing the child solely because he
was exposed to domestic violence.175 For example, the mother
was not ordered to attend any parenting classes to teach her
about the importance of sending her children to school.176 Thus,
the primary focus of the neglect proceeding appears to have
been the children’s exposure to domestic violence: the exact
scenario prohibited by Nicholson.177
Similarly, in In re Aiden L. a battered mother was found to
have neglected her child by “allowing him to be exposed to an
incident involving domestic violence” where the father
ransacked the mother’s home looking for money he believed she
had stolen from him.178 As additional evidence of the mother’s
alleged neglect, CPS also blamed the mother for the unclean
condition of her apartment.179 The court did not find the
mother’s testimony that the apartment’s condition was temporary
and due to the father’s rampage to be credible.180 While the
unsanitary condition of the apartment may certainly have been a
valid ground on which to find the mother neglectful, the court
172
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fails to articulate any understanding of the possible connection
between the domestic violence and the dirty apartment.181 For
example, there is no mention in the opinion of whether the
mother was unable to clean the apartment because her primary
focus was on keeping her child and herself safe from the father’s
abuse.182 Moreover, while the court faults the mother for
allowing the father to have contact with the child, its opinion
does not include any analysis of whether the mother reasonably
could have concluded that this was a safer course of action for
her child than refusing to allow the father into their home.183 Of
course, it is entirely plausible that even after conducting this
more detailed analysis the mother may still have been found
neglectful. Yet, in order to further Nicholson’s goal of
protecting battered mothers from being blamed for their abuse, it
is crucial that the court articulate its consideration of the
Nicholson factors when determining whether a battered mother
has acted reasonably under the circumstances.184
In re Aiden L. shows that the New York courts have not yet
embraced the full vision of Nicholson.185 In re Christopher B. is
another case that indicates that the underlying spirit of Nicholson has
yet to be realized. In Christopher B., the court found a battered
mother guilty of neglect because “the child was exposed to regular
domestic violence and regular drug use by the father.”186 In addition,
the court determined that the mother had no awareness of the impact
of the father’s actions on her child.187 Yet, the court did not elaborate
on the mother’s lack of “awareness”188 and did not consider the
possibility that the father’s drug use may have either contributed to
181
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or have been an integral part of his physical abuse.189 The court may
very well have been correct in its conclusion that the mother was
ignorant of the impact of the father’s substance abuse on the child
and that this made her a neglectful parent. However, the opinion
was too conclusory, ignoring the analysis that Nicholson requires.
Nicholson demands that the court specifically identify why it found
the mother’s alleged lack of awareness to be enough to qualify as
neglect, in order to ensure that she is not being charged with neglect
solely based on her batterer’s actions.190
Green v. Mattingly offers further evidence that New York
courts fail to realize Nicholson’s vision by continuing neglect
proceedings against battered mothers.191 In this case, a battered
mother’s seven-month-old son, T.C., was removed from her
care because her husband had slapped him in the face, despite
the fact that the mother immediately reported his actions to the
authorities.192 CPS initiated child neglect proceedings against
both Ms. Green and her husband, alleging that Ms. Green was
aware that her husband had hit their child in the past and that
she had willfully not complied with an existing order of
protection by living with her husband.193 Based on these claims,
T.C. was removed from his mother’s home and placed in foster
care.194 Ms. Green filed an application pursuant to Family Court
Act section 1028 for an order returning T.C. to her custody.195
After four days in foster care, Family Court ordered that T.C.
be returned to his mother immediately, but the neglect
proceedings against her remained open for over one year.196
Since the facts in Green are distinguishable from those in
Nicholson, the Green court was able to avoid Nicholson’s
important precedent. In Nicholson, the children had merely been
189
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exposed to domestic violence but had not been physically abused
themselves.197 In contrast, the husband in Green had slapped the
child in the face, and there was evidence that he had spanked
him in the past.198 Clearly, there is a difference between a child
who has only been exposed to domestic violence and one who
has actually been physically abused. Yet, in a case such as this,
where the abusive partner is the only parent accused of violence
and the mother immediately notified the authorities upon
learning of her husband’s actions, an analysis of the Nicholson
factors would help to shed light on why the family court found
that the mother had failed to act as “a reasonable and prudent
parent” would under the circumstances.199 For example, it is
possible that Ms. Green thought it would be safer for her and
T.C. if she allowed her husband to live with them than if she
reported him to the police, which might only enrage him.200 It is
vital that New York courts clearly delineate their consideration
of the Nicholson factors in order to further Nicholson’s policy of
not blaming victims of domestic violence for their abuse.
Similarly, while a battered mother’s reluctance to leave an
abusive relationship may be legitimate grounds for finding her
neglectful, compliance with Nicholson requires that courts delve
beneath the surface in analyzing the mother’s reasons for not
wanting her batterer to leave her home. In In re Angelique L., a
battered mother was found guilty of neglect after a CPS
caseworker discovered that her live-in boyfriend hit her in front
of her children.201 The caseworker filed a neglect petition against
the mother based on her alleged failure to protect her children
from exposure to repeated incidents of domestic violence, and
the children’s report to the caseworker that their mother’s
197
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boyfriend had hit them in the past.202 The court distinguished this
case from Nicholson because here the boyfriend had also hit the
children, and the children were considered to be “extremely
vulnerable.”203
While Nicholson dictates that the children’s “special
vulnerabilities” are a proper consideration for courts in
determining neglect cases, Nicholson also requires the court to
consider additional factors in determining the imminent risk to
the child of remaining in the home versus the potential harm of
removal.204 For example, in Angelique L., while the court briefly
mentions that the mother did not wish to press criminal charges
against her boyfriend and did not want him to leave the home
because she depended on him for financial support, it does not
integrate this into its analysis of whether the mother failed to
exercise a minimal level of care towards her child.205 However,
Nicholson demands that courts undertake this type of analysis in
determining whether the mother’s psychological state has been
so negatively impacted by the abuse that she cannot be trusted to
properly care for her child, or whether providing her with
practical services to help her become self-sufficient could
alleviate the problem.206
These cases serve as examples of the ways in which CPS
continues to punish battered mothers for being victims of
domestic violence, while technically staying within the
parameters of Nicholson. Therefore, when exposure to domestic
violence is the primary charge levied against a battered mother
in a neglect proceeding, it is imperative that the family courts
carefully examine the basis for the supplemental allegation, so as
to avoid unfairly blaming victims of domestic violence for their
batterers’ actions.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
The Nicholson case was a significant beginning in the
evolution of the child welfare system’s response to families
affected by domestic violence; CPS may no longer charge
battered mothers with neglect solely because they were abused in
front of their children.207 However, more than mere compliance
with the literal command of Nicholson is required to bring about
real change. To fully achieve the policy vision of Nicholson,
both CPS and the family courts must fully embrace its goal of
ensuring that the system does not blame battered mothers merely
for being victims. In addition, more funding must be dedicated
to providing emergency housing to domestic violence victims so
that every abused woman who makes the life changing decision
to leave an abusive relationship has somewhere safe she can
go.208
When the primary reason for keeping a neglect proceeding
against a nonviolent parent open is that her children have been
exposed to domestic violence, CPS must prove that the child’s
life or health is at imminent risk warranting removal from the
battered mother’s care.209 Absent this showing, CPS must
articulate a separate, credible ground for suspecting impairment
or risk of impairment to the child.210 If CPS fails to meet this
burden, family courts should not hesitate to dismiss these neglect
proceedings in their entirety.211 Ordering battered women to
comply with domestic violence services within the punitive
context of neglect proceedings and to enforce orders of
protection against their batterers under threat of losing their
children is not the proper way to address the needs of domestic
212
violence victims.
207
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A. CPS- and Family Court-Based Solutions
Family courts fail battered women when they continue, postNicholson, to hold them responsible for domestic violence. In
cases where CPS does not meet its burden of proving imminent
risk to the child, courts may still keep proceedings open
although they cannot articulate a separate ground for suspecting
neglect.213 This practice furthers CPS’s misguided response to
the Nicholson holding.214 For example, family courts typically
order battered mothers charged with neglect to comply with CPS
referrals for domestic violence shelters, leave their abusers, and
obtain domestic violence counseling.215 While such orders may
be intended to ensure the safety of the mother and her child,
Professor Justine Dunlap argues that charging battered women
with neglect “re-victimizes the mother by removing her children
and premising their return on her conformity with governmental
edict.”216 In reality, these orders are more punishing than
supportive because the battered mother is at risk of losing her
children if she does not comply.217
In addition, maintaining a neglect proceeding against a
battered mother may reinforce the power and control dynamic
which is typical in abusive relationships.218 Despite having left
her batterer, the family court steps in and reinforces the
batterer’s control over the mother.219 The judge generally orders
her to comply with CPS supervision, including referrals for
domestic violence shelters, as well as announced and
unannounced visits to her home.220 In addition, she will usually
be ordered to enforce an order of protection against her abuser,
who may prevent her from calling the police or threaten to hurt
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her children if she reports his violation.221 She may even be
charged with neglect if her batterer’s violation of the order of
protection is the cause of her noncompliance with the court
order.222
While family courts may have the best of intentions in
issuing these orders, they are nonetheless determined on the
basis of the woman’s status as a victim of domestic violence.223
If the woman does not comply with these orders, she may lose
custody of her children.224
In this way, survivors of domestic violence are blamed for
the abuse they have suffered.225 Instead, CPS caseworkers should
be responsible for obtaining and enforcing orders of protection,
rather than battered women.226 Batterers would presumably be
more obedient to orders of protection likely to be enforced by
CPS, as opposed to orders obtained by women who may be too
frightened to report their abusers’ violations to the police.227
Furthermore, this practice would send a strong message to
batterers that they are solely responsible for their actions and
that domestic violence will not be tolerated.228
In addition, collaboration between domestic violence
advocates and CPS is crucial to adequately training CPS
caseworkers to respond to families affected by domestic
violence.229 Children’s welfare does not exist separate and apart
221
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from the welfare of their parents.230 The child’s welfare is linked
to the safety of his or her mother, just as in many ways, the
mother’s well being depends on the safety of her child.231
Therefore, fostering improved communication between domestic
violence advocates and child protection workers is a crucial step
towards decreasing the number of child neglect cases that are
unnecessarily brought against battered mothers, while ensuring
the holistic support of the entire family.232
B. Increased Emergency Housing Options
In addition, the availability of domestic violence shelters is
indispensable in helping victims of domestic violence
successfully escape their abusive relationships.233 Not only do
these shelters provide battered women with safe and confidential
housing, but they offer vital services such as counseling, legal
advocacy, and job training to their residents.234 Instead of simply
providing temporary housing to battered women, domestic
violence shelters are intended to provide them with the tools
they need to achieve independence.235 This is critical because
battered women often face a catch-22 problem due to their
common economic dependence and social isolation.236 If they
leave, they will have nowhere to go and no way to support their
children.237 If they stay, they will be subject to continued
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abuse.238 Thus, emergency housing is significant in helping
domestic violence victims leave abusive relationships.239
Unfortunately, there is a dire lack of emergency housing
options in New York. Many women are turned away from
domestic violence shelters that are at their maximum resident
capacity.240 In New York City, if there is no space at domestic
violence shelters, victims are referred to the Prevention
Assistance and Temporary Housing (“PATH”) office, which will
assign them to a regular homeless shelter.241 Prior to December
2009, the New York City Housing Authority’s (“NYCHA”)
Section 8 program enabled victims of domestic violence to obtain
rental assistance vouchers.242 However, due to federal budget cuts,
NYCHA has stopped accepting new applications to this
program.243 Furthermore, over 3,000 previously issued vouchers
were revoked.244 Thus, even if a woman enters a domestic
violence shelter, she will likely face an uphill battle when she
must eventually secure permanent housing.245
If the child welfare system expects battered mothers to
successfully leave their abusive partners, it is imperative that the
238
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resources necessary to accomplish this are available to them.
Victims of domestic violence should not have to choose between
staying with their batterers and becoming homeless.246 Therefore,
more government funding must be directed to providing
emergency housing to survivors of domestic violence in order to
facilitate their safe transition into self-sufficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nicholson was an important first step in the child welfare
system’s recognition that nonviolent battered mothers should not
be charged with neglect solely because their children have been
exposed to domestic violence.247 True change, however, requires
more than technical compliance with Nicholson’s holding. To
fully embrace the underlying spirit of Nicholson, family courts
must consistently reinforce the Nicholson holding by undergoing
a comprehensive analysis of battered mothers’ behavior in
determining whether they should be deemed neglectful.248
In addition, CPS caseworkers must receive proper training in
how to skillfully respond to families affected by domestic
violence.249 In order to be effective, this training should
encompass the complex interpersonal dynamics of an abusive
relationship and emphasize that the psychological effects of
domestic violence are often temporary and may be rectified in
many cases by removing batterers from the home via an order of
protection.250 Furthermore, there must be sufficient community
support for domestic violence survivors who make the difficult
decision to leave an abusive relationship.251 Increased funding to
organizations and government resources providing domestic
violence shelters and permanent housing to survivors is crucial
252
in ensuring the safety of battered mothers and their children.
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In this way, New York child welfare agencies and family courts
will be able to truly hold batterers accountable for their actions
and support families affected by domestic violence in their quest
towards safety and independence.

